This paper proposes a methodology to address the trading strategies of a proactive distribution company (PDISCO) engaged in the transmission-level (TL) markets. A one-leader multi-follower bilevel model is presented to formulate the gaming framework between the PDISCO and markets. The lower-level (LL) problems include the TL day-ahead market and scenario-based real-time markets, respectively with the objectives of maximizing social welfare and minimizing operation cost. The upper-level (UL) problem is to maximize the PDISCO's profit across these markets. The PDISCO's strategic offers/bids interactively influence the outcomes of each market. Since the LL problems are linear and convex, while the UL problem is non-linear and non-convex, an equivalent primal-dual approach is used to reformulate this bilevel model to a solvable mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The effectiveness of the proposed model is verified by case studies.
Introduction
Distributed energy resources (DERs) tend to occupy a high share in the 75 distribution-level (DL) network [1, 2] . In a deregulated environment, this stimulates the distribution company (DISCO) to preferentially procure DERs' generations at low prices. In the U.S., the recent initiative named the New York
Reforming Energy Vision (NY REV) [3] has addressed the regulatory changes to liberate a DL market for cost-effective use of DERs. As indicated in the NY 80 REV, a Distributed System Platform Provider (DSPP) will modernize its distri- and stochastic DGs [10] are fully presented and discussed by one-leader multifollower bilevel models, respectively.
At differing market stages, bilevel modeling is increasingly used to determine the trading strategies [11] . For instance, in [12] , given wind power production as a set of correlated scenarios, a scenario-based bilevel model is presented to derive strategic offers for a wind producer within markets. To minimize the payment in pool markets, a multi-period bilevel model [13] is proposed to address the consumers' strategies in terms of LMPs. From procurement perspectives, to establish a robust retail market, the role of a utility is suggested as a portfolio 140 manager [14] . For a community-scale MG, a two-stage stochastic program is used to optimize its power scheduling and bidding strategy on the basis of dayahead prices [15] .
Regarding the energy development and policy, the renewable energy procurement and the related incentive policies in the state of Illinois in the U.S.
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are reviewed and discussed in [16] . The economic value of wind-based DGs is addressed in [17] by applying a Longstaff-Schwartz option pricing method. To evaluate the impact of residential DR choices considering uncertainties, a probabilistic methodology is presented to trade DR in a distribution energy market [18] . In competitive energy markets, the benefits of the Community Energy 150 Storage (CES) devices are analyzed in [19] for optimizing the power system operations. Storage-like devices are also investegated in load leveling [20] through complementarity constraints and a new and exact relaxation method. In [21] , new functionalities of utilities and distributed electricity prosumers are indentified and cleared with the retail electricity market price. In order to faciliate 155 large-scale EV charging facilities and energy storage devices participating in frequency regulation, [22] proposes control strategies to enhance the integration of renewable energy.
In view of the context above, the contributions of this paper are threefold: 2) Propose a bilevel model for the PDISCO to derive continuous strategic offers and bids by rationally procuring the DERs' portfolio.
3) Reformulate the PDISCO's game-theoretic model to an MPEC by replacing the LL market problems with an equivalent primal-dual approach.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework of the PDISCO trading in TL markets and procuring from DL DERs. The corresponding bilevel game-theoretic model is proposed in Section 3, in which the primal-dual approach is also indicated in detail. In Section 4, the numerical results of the case studies are reported and analyzed. Finally, some relevant 170 remarks are concluded in Section 5.
PDISCO Trading in Markets
Till now, at the transmission level, electricity markets are normally recognized as wholesale markets and realized as pools. For short-term transactions, the electricity can be traded in the day-ahead and real-time markets. Each 175 wholesale market follows a auction framework, which is commonly applied to find a trade-off between the offers and bids submitted by producers and consumers, respectively. Each offer/bid is specified as a set of price-quantity pairs.
On the other hand, if the transmission network is considered in a market-clearing procedure, a LMP occurs at each bus, covering line congestion and line losses 180 [5] .
As shown in Fig.1 , to trade in the TL markets, the PDISCO has two optional strategies to take part in each market, i.e., offer or bid in the day-ahead market and real-time market per scenario ω. For two-stage market operation, the dayahead market is cleared prior to the real-time markets. Therefore, at each time t, 
Problem Formulation
Participating in the TL markets, the PDISCO's strategic trading problem can be formulated as a bilevel one-leader multi-follower game-theoretic model [5] . One follower is characterized as an LL day-ahead market problem with the goal to maximize the TL social welfare. Other followers are scenario-based 205 LL real-time market problems. An LL problem per scenario ω seeks to achieve the cost minimization during the real-time TL balancing. In particular, to obtain the trade-offs between the markets, the offering/bidding strategies of the PDISCO are conducted by the UL problem with the purpose of minus-profit minimization. 210 
Assumptions
The assumptions of the proposed bilevel model are as follows:
1) The day-ahead and real-time offering/bidding strategies of a single PDISCO are considered to be involved in the corresponding TL markets.
2) The DL network is assumed to be operated and owned by the PDISCO, 215 and interconnected to the TL network via only one main substation.
3) Only the active power is considered to be traded in markets. At each time t, we assume the reactive power exchanging between DL and TL can be balanced at the DL main substation.
4) The PDISCO can explicitly anticipate the impacts of its strategic of-220 fers/bids, versus the markets' outcomes. One offer/bid per time t for each market.
LL problems
Note that the outcomes of the LL problems can directly affect the PDISCO's offering/bidding strategies in the UL problem. Thus, the corresponding LL 225 problem formulations are given below.
1) LL day-ahead market problem:
Minimize
For PDISCO's location bus I:
For other buses:
, θ 0 tn is the variable set of the LL dayahead problem.
The day-ahead market clearing is modeled within the LL problem (1). The objective function (1.1) is to minimize the minus (maximize) TL social welfare, 230 i.e., the generation and reserve cost of individual generators plus the PDISCO's strategic offers/bids (non-negative P DDA t is offer, while the negative is bid, ∀t), and minus the revenue of sales to the other TL demands. We assume all the generators are dispatchable. DC power flow is adopted to formulate the TL operation conditions. At each time t: Constraints (1.2) Correspondingly, the dual variables for each group of constraints are indicated at the right side of a colon.
2) LL real-time market problems:
For other buses: 
UL problem 260
Interrelated with the LL problems, the offers/bids determined by the UL problem inevitably influence the markets' outcomes in the LL problems. Therefore, the UL problem covers the PDISCO's offering/bidding strategies in individual markets, DL network constraints, and markets' arguments regarding the LMPs and production/consumption quantities.
PDISCO day-ahead constraints (3.2)-(3.16):
For the main substation (PDISCO's reference bus 1):
For the other buses: For the main substation (PDISCO's reference bus 1):
For the other buses:
,ω , δ tiω , V tiω is the variable set of the UL PDISCO problem (3) . Ξ DU AL is the set of the dual variables.
To minimize the PDISCO's minus-profit (maximize profit), the objective For the LL day-ahead market problem:
For the LL real-time market problems: Real-time market problems MPPDC constraints:
(2.2) − (2.10) and (5) .
Case Studies
In this section, a modified 14-bus DL network [24] interconnected to a 9-bus TL network [25] is used to validate the effectiveness of the proposed bilevel model for deriving the PDISCO's strategic offers/bids and markets' performances.
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To simulate the uncertainties of individual DERs, the scenario handling approach [4] is adopted to create 1000 scenarios and reduce to 15 scenarios for the case studies.
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All cases are implemented on a 3.6 GHz Intel Core i7 processor based on a 64-bit Windows 7 system carrying 16 GB of RAM, and solved by CONOPT3 DERs. The mappings of the DERs and buses are WT1:11, WT2:13, WT3:9, PV1:2, PV2:7, and PV3:12. For simplicity, the capacity limit of each DER is set to 18 MVA, and the related power factor is given as 0.90/WT and 0.95/PV.
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The PDISCO rationally procures the DERs' portfolios and strategically trades in individual markets with 24 times per stage. The purchase price λ DER t for each DER's generation is assumed to be unique, as shown in Table I , which also includes the sales price λ DSD t , and network operation cost C DS t . The DL multiplier α t is used to obtain the demand P DSD tl , Q DSD tl on the base value described 345 in [24] .
For the market-operated 9-bus network: The PDISCO's network is assumed to be interconnected at TL bus 4 with a power injection limit 100 MW. The line capacity is set to 500 MW. Table II shows Other DL and TL parameters can be found in [24] [25] . All the price param- 
PDISCO trading strategies
The PDISCO's strategic offers and bids make up continuous curves for trading in the two-stage market, as shown in Fig.2 . As expected, in the day-ahead 360 market, the PDISCO behaves as an active producer to provide production in hours 1-9, 14-17, and 22-24, with lower offering prices (around 28 e/MW). In the remaining hours, the PDISCO performs as an active consumer to acquire power at higher prices (about 32 e/MW or more). For illustrative purposes, in serve that, the day-ahead profit peaks occur consistently with the load peaks.
In contrast, the real-time profits have few volatilities, which are basically rec- 
Impact on TL generators
The PDISCO's offers/bids can vary the markets' outcomes by interrelating with the TL generators' offers. For brevity, the cleared power quantities of generator 1 are taken as an illustrative example to address the PDISCO's impacts 400 on the markets, as shown in Fig. 5 . The comparative situation is carried out on the TL network without the PDISCO's trading strategies and executed high real-time deviation (±10%) on each DL demand. The generation offered and reserves committed (upward and downward) at the day-ahead stage are exhibited in Fig. 5(a) , and the real-time up and down regulation power are outlined 
Impact on TL markets
In addition, the comparison results also include the day-ahead social welfare and real-time operation cost of the markets, as shown in Fig. 6 . The social welfare continuously declines by considering the PDISCO's participation, reducing 420 by 12% daily. In contrast, the cost increases by 962% for the real-time market operation. In other words, the PDISCO's strategic trading negatively impacts the markets' objectives. Concerning the PDISCO's trading strategies essentially depend on the DERs' capacities, we further focus on the DERs' impacts on the PDISCO's decisions 425 by resetting the DERs' availability in additional cases. Thus, the discussions above are listed as Case 1. Case 2 increases the individual DERs' capacities to two-times higher than Case 1, while these are reduced to half in Case 3. The results of PDISCO's profits and markets' objectives are summarized in Table   III . The obtained social welfare is almost the same in Cases 1 and 3, but falls 430 by 13% for Case 2. This means higher penetration of DERs yields more offers from the PDISCO and lower social welfare in the day-ahead market. The operation cost of the real-time market increases significantly with the DERs' capacity growth in Cases 1-3. Observe that the higher DERs can not ensure a 26 higher profit for the PDISCO, while lower DERs definitely bring lower profit, 435 and even render minus-profit (in Case 3). To improve the profitability for the PDISCO, appropriate portfolio procurement is the best option. 
Conclusion
This paper presents a bilevel model for a PDISCO strategically trading within the TL two-stage markets, considering rational procurements of DERs' 440 portfolios. Crossing the markets, the continuous offers and bids are optimized to maximize the PDISCO's profit, accompanying moderate and heavy arbitrages.
Interacted with the PDISCO's strategies, the social welfare is maximized in the day-ahead market, and the operation cost minimization of the real-time market is achieved in each scenario ω. The proposed model is translated to a single-level 445 solvable MPEC with the primal-dual approach. The results of the case studies reveal that the PDISCO's strategic offers and bids are effective to maximize its profit by trading in the wholesale markets. Some relevant remarks are as follows.
1) The newly defined market player (PDISCO) and presented DL DER trad-450 ing turn the traditionally passive distribution grid into a proactive fashion. The liberalization of a DL market is an essential part in the whole chain of trading electricity, transacting with the wholesale market and acquiring DERs.
2) The increasing electricity purchases from stochastic DERs can not definitely guarantee a higher profit for the PDISCO. However, the proposed method-455 ology can assist the PDISCO to seek the appropriate portfolio procurements from DERs in differing production scenarios. 
